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The Muslim Malay Community in Southern Thailand:




This article aims to apply Abulof’s concept of “small peoples” to the case of 
the Muslim Malay Community in Southern Thailand. Existential uncertainty 
as an intersubjective reality is the defi ning characteristic of a “small people.” 
Moreover, the article explores how the Muslim Malay community in the South 
of Thailand is facing ethnonational existential threats due to the assimilationist 
policies of the central government. The Patani-Malay language and the 
Islamic religion are threatened by policies favoring a homogenous national 
culture based on a unitary nation-state held together by the three pillars of 
nation, monarchy, and religion. Finally, the article concludes that one of the 
root causes of the Southern insurgency is the perceived slow death of the 
Patani-Malay ethnonationality by a signifi cant number of traditional leaders 
and youths. Some “soft” approaches to deal with the intersubjective reality 
of existential uncertainty experienced by the Muslim Malay minority are also 
provided as tentative recommendations.
Keywords: deep South of Thailand, development, ethnic confl ict, Islam in 
Southeast Asia, Muslim Malays
We should be ashamed of ourselves for 
sitting idly by and doing nothing while 
the colonialists trampled our brothers and 
sisters. The wealth that belongs to us has 
been seized. Our rights and freedom have 
been curbed, and our religion and culture 
have been sullied…
From the Berjihad di Pattani (Liow, 2006, p. 100)
Introduction
“Small peoples” were originally defi ned by the Czech author Milan Kundera as a group 
of people who lack a sense of “eternal past and future” (Abulof 2009: 227). The concept 
was further explained and refi ned by Abulof to include three main components, which 
mainly deal with the intersubjective reality of an ethnonational group (Abulof 2009: 
229). Two important factors are a clear sense of a historical past and of a future, while 
the third component deals with the present, more specifi cally with governance and self-
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determination. In other words, a strong ethnonational group has a clear historical past, 
a strong identity, and a feeling of an assured future as a distinct group. Furthermore, 
for an ethnonational group to be strong, it must also have some sort of self-government 
in order to achieve some level of self-determination. This is exemplifi ed by the post-
World War II ideal of the nation-state; nation referring to a unitary ethnonationality, and 
state dealing with the apparatus of government and territorial sovereignty (Barber 1996; 
Chua 2007; Ellis 2009; Friedman 2000; Fukuyama 1992; Habermas 2006; Lal 2004; 
Marchetti 2009; Melle 2009; Thakur and Weiss 2009). In this scenario, an ethnonational 
group has sovereignty over its territory, and controls the government. A second scenario 
is a multiethnic state, in which ethnonational groups enjoy some measure of autonomy 
(August 1995; Feigenblatt 2007a, 2007b; Khong 2006; Kolodziej 2005; Kornprobst 
2009; Scott Cooper 2008). Examples of this are the cases of Malaysia and Switzerland. 
However, “small peoples” refers to ethnonational groups that lack those characteristics, 
and thus live in constant existential fear. It is important to note that what is signifi cant 
about the previously mentioned characteristics is their subjective character. Their 
combination results in an aggregate intersubjective reality, which is perceived by the 
group as an objective fact. Thus, a relatively strong ethnonational group in terms of 
objective resources and capabilities, such as the Israelis, can perceive themselves as a 
“small people” living in constant danger of extermination.
In the case of the Israelis, their fear is mostly that of physical extermination by 
their many enemies in the Middle East, however fear of extermination can be caused by 
other factors (Abulof 2009: 235). Abulof presents the case of the French Canadians, and 
explains how their feelings of uncertainty are due mostly to a fear of slow death through 
assimilation into the dominant Anglo culture (Abulof 2009: 230). Both groups can be 
considered to be “small peoples” in that they lack at least one of the three characteristics 
that defi ne a strong ethnonational group.
The following sections will apply the concept of “small peoples” to the case of 
Muslim Malays living in the Thai deep South. First, a brief overview of the historical 
background of the ethnonational group variously known as Muslim Thais, Malay 
Thais, and descendants of the Sultanate of Patani will be provided (Dingwerth 2008; 
Jitpiromrsi  and McCargo 2008; Neher 2002; Soldiers 2008; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 
2003). Then, a section will cover the intersubjective existential uncertainty of Malay 
Thais from the point of view of identity and self-determination, while another section 
will deal with issues of physical existential threats. Finally, the results of the two 
sections will be interpreted and explained to show how Malay Thais suffer from fear of 
extermination due to both assimilation and actual physical disappearance.
The Sultanate of Patani and its Descendants
The ethnonational group currently known as Muslim Thais is mostly found in the three 
southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, as well as a few districts of 
Songkla Province (Dingwerth 2008: 5; Liow 2006). The vast majority of the inhabitants 
of the region are Muslim and speak a dialect of Malay known as Patani-Malay. Rubber 
plantations, subsistence farming, and fi shing are the most important economic activities 
in a region that has been bypassed by the exponential growth of Thailand’s economy in 
the last decades of the twentieth century (Liow 2006; Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008). 
Moreover, per capita income in the Southern provinces is around one third of the per 
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capita income in the capital (Dingwerth 2008).
The region was formerly the independent Sultanate of Patani until it was 
forcefully annexed by Siam in 1906 (Liow 2006; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003). 
Contrary to what happened to other Malay sultanates in the peninsula after the end of 
colonial rule, the Sultanate of Patani was not given the autonomy enjoyed by luckier 
neighbors, which joined the Malay Federation, later to become the Federation of 
Malaysia (Neher 2002). Annexation instantly transformed Muslim Malays from a 
majority in their region to a minority. In addition to that, Siam became Thailand in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, which further defi ned the State as a Thai nation-
state (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008; Neher 2002; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003). 
Nationalist military governments during and after World War II further promoted 
the idea of the unitary centralized nation-state based on the three pillars of Nation, 
Monarchy, and Religion (Mulder 2000; Wyatt 2003). It is important to note that “Nation” 
refers to the Thai nation, most specifi cally central Thais, “Monarchy” refers to the often 
interrupted Chakri dynasty, and “Religion” refers to Theravada Buddhism (Mulder 
2000). The educational system was shaped so as to promote the unitary state and a 
version of history refl ecting the point of view of conservative central Thais (Somwung 
Pitiyanuwat 2005). While the propaganda machine was being set up in Bangkok, the 
government decided to promote the resettlement of Buddhist Thais to the deep South, so 
as to promote the process of assimilation (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008).
Control over the territories was centralized, and governors were always 
appointed by Bangkok, as well as most other high-ranking officials, including the 
Chularajmontri (Liow 2006: 102; Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008; Neher 2002; 
Pongsudhirak 2008; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003).1 Needless to say, most teachers in 
the deep South were also sent from Bangkok, as well as all of the teaching materials. 
For many years, only Thai was taught at schools, and Buddhism lessons were also 
compulsory. To top it all, civic education, a euphemism for royalist propaganda, was 
and still is compulsory in public schools (Somwung Pitiyanuwat 2005). The result of 
those policies was the economic stagnation of the once prosperous Sultanate of Patani. 
Moreover, Muslim leaders felt alienated by the central government and threatened by 
the onslaught of a foreign culture. One action taken by the Muslim Malay communities 
was the setting up of a parallel education system based on the ancient institutions of the 
Sultanate of Patani (Dingwerth 2008; Liow 2006). Religious schools proliferated as a 
way of coping with a lack of tolerance in the traditional Thai education system.
Over the years, the Muslim Malay community divided into three main groups: 
the traditionals, the moderns, and the hybrids ( Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008). The 
traditionals were mostly Muslim Malays who did not attend Thai public schools, 
could barely speak Thai, and attended traditional religious schools or studied abroad in 
Muslim countries. Moderns were Muslim Malays who had attended Thai public schools, 
could speak Thai fluently, had never attended a religious school, and who supported 
assimilation of Malays into Thai society as the way to successful socioeconomic 
development. Between the two groups, one fi nds the hybrids, who have attended Thai 
public schools at some point in their lives, and also religious schools. Throughout the 
Thai occupation of the Sultanate, the central government has favored dealing with the 
1   The Chularajmontri is the nominal head of the Muslim community in Thailand. He is appointed by 
the central government, and lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the Muslim Malay community in the deep 
South. The last two Chularajmontris have not been ethnic Malays.
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moderns and co-opting them in order to rule more effectively (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 
2008). This was effective for many years, due to the unwillingness of the traditionals to 
take any role in the offi cial government of the region. In other words, the traditionals 
were more concerned with protecting their culture through religious schools and 
informal community leadership than with the occupying bureaucracy sent by the central 
government. Thus, the moderns were allowed to fi ll the lower ranks of the bureaucracy 
in the deep South. Things started to change when the numerical balance moved towards 
the hybrids. More and more youths were attending Thai public schools as well as 
religious schools. The result of the shift was similar to what happened in other colonial 
societies (Hillel 2009; Ackerly and True 2008; Laffey and Weldes 2008). Hybrids started 
to feel increasingly alienated by Thai society, and left behind in terms of economic 
development. Usually, a growth in the proportion of youths in conjunction with relative 
economic deprivation leads to conflict (David Carment and Taydas 2009), and this is 
exactly what started to happen in the Thai deep South. Insurgent movements that had 
been virtually dormant for years started to regain strength, and to use more violent 
methods. Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi started to recruit young disgruntled 
hybrids to carry out daring attacks on government infrastructure. An insurgency that had 
all but died by 1990 was on the rise again in 2004 (Soldiers 2008: 1).
Regarding the actual system of government imposed by the occupying power, 
the local government was headed by the centrally appointed governor. However, power 
was always divided between the governor and the military. The names of the security 
agencies in charge of the South have changed over the years, but one of the most 
important is the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) (Dingwerth 2008: 6; 
Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008; Ungpakorn 2007). The ISOC was originally established 
to deal with the communist insurgency during the Cold War, and was later given control 
over the deep South. Several laws allow the military and the police to detain suspects 
for long periods of time without due process (Liow 2006; Soldiers 2008), and in several 
cases the military has made use of those powers to detain great numbers of suspected 
militants. Two cases are especially infamous; the Krisek Mosque massacre, and the Tak 
Bai incident. The two events claimed more than 190 lives, including many women and 
children, and both occurred at the height of the insurgency in 2004 (Liow 2006: 98; 
Ungpakorn  2007).
Muslim Malays also face the threat of Buddhist village militias supported by 
the Queen.2 Village militias, such as the Queen’s Village Protection Volunteers (Or Ror 
Bor) and the Ruam Thai (Thais United), established by Maj. General Phitak Ladkaew, 
terrorize Muslim villages with impunity. Buddhist militias usually have close ties with 
the military and the police forces in the area, and tend to function as an unoffi cial branch 
of the security forces, with little or no accountability. While the groups were established 
with the aim of protection, there have been reports of involvement in vigilante-style 
attacks against Muslims (Soldiers 2008: 17).
In summary, the Muslim Malays from the historic Sultanate of Patani have 
become second-class citizens in a Thai ethnonational state based on the three pillars of 
the Thai nation, the Chakri Dynasty, and Theravada Buddhism. Some of the existential 
threats they faced, such as a military occupation, Buddhist militias, and an intolerant 
2   Queen Sirikit has openly supported several village militias and favored the Buddhist communities in the 
deep South.
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ethnocentric educational system, have been discussed. The following sections will 
explore two other kinds of existential threats faced by the Malay minority in the deep 
South, and how the concept of “small peoples” fi ts their present intersubjective reality.
Existential Uncertainty due to Assimilation
As described in the previous section, the Thai State has attempted to forge a national 
culture based on that of Central Thais and Theravada Buddhism (Mulder 2000). The 
three pillars of the Unitary State complement each other, and preempt any attempt at 
redefining the state as a multiethnic entity, which would better reflect demographic 
reality. Thailand as a territorial entity is home to a vast array of ethnic groups (Mulder 
2000; Neher 2002; Wyatt 2003). One of the largest Chinese overseas communities has 
made a home in Thailand, and has become the backbone of the economy and some of 
the professions. Mons, hill tribe peoples, Indians, Burmese, Khmer, inter alia, are all 
present in the Thai territorial state. Nevertheless, if one reads a history book used in 
a Thai public school, one gets the idea that the territory of present day Thailand has 
always been controlled by central Thais, and that all other groups are merely guests. A 
civic religion was created to promote the monarchy as the central pillar of the nation-
state, and a highly ritualized version of Theravada Buddhism was put in the service of 
the State (Callahan  2005; Chye 2008; Hamlin 2009; Liow 2006; Ungpakorn 2007).
After Siam annexed the Sultanate of Patani, the same assimilationist approach 
was attempted with the Muslim Malay communities. Their history was omitted from the 
public school curriculum, their symbols were ignored, and Buddhism was introduced as 
part of both the offi cial curriculum and, most importantly, the hidden curriculum. The 
Civic Religion of the State, including its recently created rituals, was imposed on them 
(Ungpakorn 2007). As explained in the Introduction, the concept of “small peoples” has 
at its core a feeling of identity as a distinct ethnonational group, with a clear sense of 
past, present, and future (Abulof 2009). Before the annexation, the Sultanate of Patani 
had a clear sense of a past, a long history with its own traditions and dynasty, a clear 
sense of the present, their own State and self-determination, and a feeling of a future as 
a distinct ethnocultural group. However, that all started to change after the annexation.
The past may seem a strong foundation of an ethnocultural group, but it can also 
be undermined, since it depends on passing on knowledge about history, and history is 
written by the winners. The Thai government has ignored or simply omitted the South’s 
independent history from official accounts, including public education (Jitpiromrsi 
and McCargo 2008; Ungpakorn 2007). That means it becomes increasingly difficult 
to pass on the group memory of a unique and ancient past to the new generations. 
Elders and leaders feel that by omitting their history, the government is taking away 
their past. The past lives in the present in the memory of the living; it becomes part of 
their intersubjective reality. That part of the intersubjective reality of a group is very 
important, in that it provides a strong sociocultural base and gives a general feeling of 
stability and group strength. Thus, it is understandable that Muslim Malays in the deep 
South feel uncertainty regarding the “future” of their past. They fear that their unique 
past will be forgotten, and future generations will live without a clear idea about where 
they came from, other than the one fabricated by the central government. Therefore, the 
imposition of a unified history omitting the unique contribution of the Muslim South 
has threatened the sense of “past” of the Muslim community, leading to a feeling of 
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existential uncertainty.
Now let us consider the present. The three pillars of the nation-state, the central 
government’s propaganda machine, and the media all promote the vision of a unitary 
state based on Central Thai culture (Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003). It is clear that 
Muslim communities feel that their culture and distinct way of life is threatened in 
the present. Civic religion is full of rituals stressing Theravada Buddhism, the Chakri 
dynasty, and Thai culture (Mulder 2000). The Muslim community feels bombarded 
by assimilationist propaganda from all corners. One simple yet striking example of 
the degree of force employed by the government in order to promote the assimilation 
of the Muslim South can be seen in any movie theater. Every movie in every theater 
throughout the country must be preceded by a propaganda music video exhorting the 
King (“Asia: The Trouble with Harry; Thailand’s Lese-majeste Law” 2009). People are 
required to stand for the full duration of the song as a sign of respect and “submission”. 
Failure to stand is not only punished through the usual method of ostracism, but also 
through the draconian lese majeste, which means that any citizen can accuse the 
“offender” of disrespect to the monarchy, and the accused can be sentenced to a jail 
term of up to 15 years (“Asia: The First Hurdle; Thai Politics” 2009; “Asia: The Trouble 
with Harry; Thailand’s Lese-majeste Law” 2009; “Leaders: The King and Them; 
Thailand’s Monarchy” 2008; “A Right Royal Mess; Thailand’s King and its Crisis” 
2008; Ungpakorn 2007). Needless to say, this has happened several times, not only in 
the South, but also in other parts of the country. It is important to note the symbolic 
nature of the ritual, and how it pervades even the private sector, such as movie theaters. 
Other examples can be seen in offi cial school books and offi cial holidays. Thus, Muslim 
communities feel themselves to be in a constant state of siege by Thai culture and civic 
religion. Moreover, Patani-Malay is not used in government schools in the South; only 
Central Thai is taught, which means that if left to the public school system, children 
would not learn their ethnonational group’s ancient language (Liow 2006; Jitpiromrsi 
and McCargo 2008).
It is not hard to see why the Muslim communities in the South do not identify 
themselves with the symbols of civic religion; after all, the Queen did not establish 
Muslim Community Defense groups as seen in the previous section (Soldiers 2008: 
17). Thus, the Muslim community does not have a strong feeling of “present” as a 
distinct ethnonational community. Their intersubjective reality is one of the threat of 
assimilation into Thai culture. The picture is very similar in terms of religion, which has 
led the community to renewed attempts to promote a parallel system of Muslim schools 
to protect their religion and to instruct new generations in their faith. From the point of 
view of the Muslim Thai community, there is a clear existential threat to their culture 
and religion, both in terms of the “past” and the “present”.
In terms of their view of the future as a distinct sociocultural group, their 
existence cannot be taken for granted. Fewer members of the new generations are part 
of the traditional group, and keeping Patani-Malay alive is a challenge, considering 
that public education is conducted in Thai. Thus, the Muslim Malay community in 
Southern Thailand cannot take its future existence as a given. The importance of this 
intersubjective phenomenon is that it differs from the normal state of affairs for strong 
ethnonational groups. Few Japanese would question the existence of the Japanese 
nation in the future; its existence is taken for granted. However, for the Muslim Malay 
community in Southern Thailand, the present undermines the past, and diminishes 
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the possibilities for a future. In summary, government policies forcefully promoting 
conversion to a civic religion based on Central Thai culture has undermined the 
historical base of the Muslim Malay minority. Moreover, the day-to-day experiences of 
members of this ethnonational group face myriad attempts to force their assimilation 
into a foreign culture, and in the process this takes away the normal cognitive 
assumption of an eternal future as a distinct group. Therefore, the Muslim community 
in the deep South can be considered to be a “small people”, suffering from challenges 
similar to those faced by French Canadians on the sociocultural front, while also facing 
physical existential threats similar to those feared by Israelis.
Existential Uncertainty due to Annihilation and/or Internal Displacement
An ethnonational group may face physical threats to their existence. In a case 
approaching a Weberian ideal type, the Israelis have faced several attempts by other 
ethnonational groups to exterminate them (Reisman 1981; Bzostek and Robison 2008; 
Waxman 2009). This threat is still present in the collective subconscious of the Jewish 
and Israeli communities. Fears of obliteration are reinforced by hostile statements made 
by leaders of neighboring countries calling for the destruction of the State of Israel 
(Abulof 2009; Waxman 2009). While the physical threats faced by the Muslim Malay 
community in the deep South are not at such a macro scale as those faced by Israel, 
they do have some common characteristics with the experience of Jews during the early 
years of the Nazi regime (Roberts 1997). First of all, there is no rule of law in the South, 
but rather a permanent State of Emergency under martial law (AHRC 2009; Jitpiromrsi 
and McCargo 2008). Members of the military and the police have wide discretionary 
powers to make arrests without a court order, and may keep suspects in custody for long 
periods of time without access to a lawyer (AHRC 2009). Beyond the powers enjoyed 
under martial law, the military enjoys virtual impunity from any atrocities committed by 
its members in the deep South. More than 3000 people have died since 2004 due to the 
insurgency. The military has promoted a military solution to the unrest in the Southern 
provinces, leading to atrocities such as the attack on the Krisek Mosque and the Tai Bai 
incidents, in which almost 200 civilians died (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008). Military 
tactics also include sweeping operations into villages suspected of harboring insurgents, 
and widespread intimidation of the civilian population (AHRC 2009). In order to keep 
suspects out of their villages for longer periods of time, the military has established 
“reeducation camps” outside the deep South. Many suspects are virtually forced to 
accept incarceration in these camps, with the result that many innocent Muslim men 
have had to leave their families and villages for prolonged periods of time, and thus 
have left their families in dire economic circumstances.
In order to truly understand the scale of the military operation in the South, it is 
worthwhile examining the increases in the military budget over the years. The budget 
rose from $2.4 billion in 2004 to $4.2 billion in 2008 (Dingwerth 2008: 6). Taking into 
consideration that Thailand is still a developing country, and that the Southern provinces 
are among the poorest in the country, it is ironic that billions of dollars are being used by 
the military rather than in tackling the root causes of the confl ict, such as asymmetrical 
development and unemployment (Liow 2006). Due to the exponential power imbalance 
between the military and the Muslim community, and the aggressive military tactics 
used to deal with Southern unrest, it is understandable that the Muslim community 
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lives in an intersubjective reality of fear of physical annihilation. Muslim communities 
have to cope with the realities of a military occupation with very little respect for their 
physical safety.
Unrest in the South has also led to the gradual internal displacement of 
Muslims to other parts of the country in order to escape the violence. This leads to the 
dismemberment of families and villages, and the disruption of social interaction with 
other members of the community. In addition, early policies of the central government 
shortly after the annexation relocated thousands of Buddhist Thais to the Southern 
provinces in an attempt to reduce the relative majority of Muslims in the region, and 
thus ease assimilation (Soldiers 2008; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003). The influx of 
Buddhist Thais to the area further raised the fears of the Muslim community in terms 
of its historical ownership of the land in the region, and the possible sociodemographic 
changes to the population in the area. Relocation of thousands of Thais into the 
Southern provinces was perceived as an attempt to dilute and divide the Muslim Malay 
community, and in that way ease its assimilation and control by the central government.
In conclusion, the Muslim community in the deep South has faced and still 
faces physical threats to its existence. The prolonged military occupation of the region, 
in addition to the aggressive military solutions pursued by the security forces in order 
to deal with Southern unrest, further exacerbate the situation. Furthermore, the lack of 
accountability and rule of law disrupt the daily lives of entire villages due to the ever-
present possibility of death, incarceration in a camp, or internal dislocation. The physical 
threats faced by the Muslim community in the deep South are very real, and lead to a 
diminished existence in which the present is at best liminal, and the future uncertain.
Conclusion
As shown in the two previous sections, the Muslim community in the deep South 
of Thailand lives in an intersubjective state of existential uncertainty. Threats to its 
culture, religion, and sense of historical past due to policies of the central government 
lead the embattled community to a diminished existence, and an ever-present feeling 
of uncertainty. Thus the sociocultural aspect of the Muslim community as a distinct 
ethnonational entity is under constant threat from external sources, and because of 
that, its future existence cannot be taken for granted by its members. The same is true 
in terms of the physical factors of self-determination. The overwhelming military 
superiority enjoyed by the central government and its use as a tool to subdue and 
forcefully assimilate the deep South limits the freedom of action of the Muslim 
community. Threats to the physical integrity of the community as an integrated entity 
through forced dislocation, vigilante attacks, raids, and detention, inter alia, all help 
create an intersubjective reality characterized by the fear of the possibility of physical 
destruction. Therefore, the Muslim community in the deep South can be considered 
a “small people” fighting for its right to exist, both as a physical entity and as a 
sociocultural ethnonational group.
Limitations and Further Research
The present article follows an interpretative approach to the confl ict in the Thai deep 
South that concentrates on the intersubjective realities of the Muslim community 
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regarding its level of uncertainty in terms of existential threats, both physical and 
sociocultural. Needless to say, this interpretation needs to be complemented by 
attitudinal research conducted in the affected communities, as well as in-depth 
interviews with opinion leaders in the Muslim South. Due to the macro level of analysis 
taken in this article, the Muslim community was assumed to be relatively monolithic, 
with the exception of a brief discussion about the three main groups composing 
it. However, the Muslim communities, as well as the insurgency, are relatively 
heterogeneous and dynamic entities (Dingwerth 2008; Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008; 
Neher  2002; Soldiers 2008; Ungpakorn 2007; Wyatt 2003). In addition, further research 
is needed in terms of the policy making process undertaken by the central government 
and related stakeholders to deal with the problems faced by the deep South since 2004. 
Future studies dealing with attitudinal change in Muslim communities, as well as a 
detailed analysis and evaluation of the Thai government’s approach to the Southern 
unrest, could add needed empirical support to this interpretative study.
Recommendations
Since this article deals with the intersubjective reality of the Muslim community in the 
deep South, a few recommendations dealing with that reality are provided. Assuming 
that the Muslim community feels a high level of existential uncertainty, both physically 
and socioculturally, one way to deal with some of the grievances of the community 
would be to tackle that intersubjective reality. Note that in order to deal with that 
intersubjective reality, it is not only necessary to deal with the actual “objective” 
reality of the Muslim South, but also to deal with their perceptions of that reality. Some 
concepts can be borrowed from international relations and diplomacy to deal with the 
precarious intersubjective reality of the Muslim community. Lessons from preventive 
diplomacy can be applied when the government or one of its agencies deals with the 
Muslim community. Confi dence-building measures can lower the sense of threat felt by 
the community when dealing with government forces. Finally, second-track diplomacy 
can improve communication and reduce suspicion between members of the Muslim 
community and those of the majority population. Some of the previous approaches 
have been attempted at several points during the confl ict. Most efforts to deal with the 
intersubjective reality of the Muslim community have come from civil society and 
academics, and have produced some positive results (Jitpiromrsi and McCargo 2008). 
However, more government reassurance is needed, since the Muslim community 
considers the government to be the prime threat.
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